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1. Introduction 
The assessment of the social value of multiperiod effects (costs and 
benefits) of public policy decisions is usually based on the net 
present value eriterion. The use of this eriterion is based on two 
major assumptions: (i) the possibility of expressing all relevant 
impacts of a decision in a common cardinal (usually monetary) denomi-
nator; (ii) the existence of an appropriate social rate of discount 
which transforms all future flows into present values. Clearly, these 
two assumptions are not entirely independent: if no monetary cardinal 
metric can be specified for the effects of a decision on a plan or 
project, it becomes also problematic to use a conventional social rate 
of discount; besides, various authors have argued that in case of 
intangible effects which cannot be valued in a monetary sense, it may 
be plausible to adjust the social rate of discount. 
The present study will mainly focus on the question whether the 
social rate of discount in public decision-making may be adjusted for 
specific circumstances. There is already a vast amount of literature 
(starting off from Hotelling, Pigou and Ramsey in the 1920s) on the 
role and the value of the discount rate in general, and there is no 
reason to repeat what has already been said in the literature on this 
theme. Interested readers are referred to Arrow and Kurz (1970), 
Baumol (1968), Bradford (1975), Eckstein (1975), Marglin (1963),. 
Mendelsohn (1981) and Sen (1967), among others. 
Theoretically, the social rate of discount should reflect the oppor-
tunity cost of postponement of receipt of any benefit emanating from 
the implementation of a public investment project. This would require 
an assessment of welfare foregone by not having these benefits availa-
ble for immediate consumption or reinvestment. However, the assessment 
of these opportunity costs is far from easy and often an illusion. In 
this context, Lind (1982, p. 22) remarks: 
"...if one were to establish the social rate of discount so that 
it properly reflected the differences in the opportunity costs 
and riskiness of different projects and so that it properly re-
flected the social rate of time preference as well, one would 
have to set a different rate for almost every project and the 
choice of the social discount rate would depend upon many 
things." 
Despite the extensive literature on the social rate of discount, it 
is striking to observe that no concensus among economists has emerged 
as to the appropriate value of the discount rate in the practice of 
public policy. Cohsequently, policy practice is usually based on ad 
hoc rules of thumb which are not thoroughly rooted in economie theory. 
Large international organizations (the World Bank, e.g.) and national 
or regional governments are facing an unsatisfactory situation in 
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which their decision cannot firmly be based on economie principles. 
It is worth noting that in real-world practice one often uses the 
market rate of interest as a reasonable proxy for the social rate of 
discount, Zimmermann (1983) has however recently pointed out several 
weaknesses inherent in this approach, viz.: 
- the existence of a 'defective telescopic faculty1 (Pigou) among con-
sumers; 
- the neglect of the interest of future generations in case of a decay 
in their resource base due to the implementation of the project at 
hand; 
- the differences in finance policy between public and private pro-
jects; 
- the imperfect functioning of the capital market (including the ne-
glect of distributional impacts); 
- the difference in handling risks between public and private invest-
ments; 
- the difference in treating social costs (and their distributional 
impacts) in public and private investment decisions; 
- the difference in institutional patterns of decision-making between 
public and private projects (in terms of ex ante coordination, 
procedural planning and the use of a planning horizon). 
Another interesting observation is however that it is increasingly 
argued that a uniform discount rate which treats all public projects 
equally - irrespective of the context, their effects and their time 
horizon -, is difficult to justify from an economie viewpoint. 
The present paper aims at providing a systematic review of the 
arguments pro and contra a uniform discount rate. Four main categories 
of arguments in favour of a flexible social rate of discount will be 
distinguished, viz.: 
(a) the (intergenerational) equity motive 
(b) the uncertainty and risk motive 
(c) the financial crowding out motive 
(d) the externalities and intangibles motive 
Each of these four classes of motives will critically be reviewed, 
while the results of these findings will briefly be included in a 
systematic survey table. It will be concluded that the use of a flexi-
ble social rate of discount, which is dependent on specific circum-
stanceo (e.g., the context, the type of project or the type of im-
pacts), can be justified on the basis of these arguments. 
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arise if the present generation would neglect to offer a financial 
compensation to future generations in case of damage to these genera-
tions (assessed on the basis of the conventional discount rate). 
Clearly, if suoh a corapensation would not be taken into consideration 
(which is usually the case), a reduction in the discount rate raight 
assure the same effect as the abovementioned compensation (see also 
Pearce, 1977). 
In conclusion, given the inertia prevailing in most economies to 
take into consideration the interest of future generations, a downward 
adjustment of the value of the conventional rate of social discount is 
justifiable. 
3. The Uncertainty and Risk Motive 
In addition to intergenerational equity issues, it is often argued 
that uncertainty and risk may yield a reasonable ground for adjusting 
the social rate of discount. For instance, in the private sector the 
(private) rate of discount may be diminished (in case of expected but 
uncertain future costs) or increased (in case of expected but uncer-
tain benefits) (see Haveman, 1977). 
Haveman also criticizes two arguments in favour of the so-called 
social risk neutrality, viz. the Arrow-Lind theorem (see Arrow and 
Lind, 1970) and the pooling argument (see Vickrey, 1964). The Arrow-
Lind theorem implies that the government may neglect the risk asso-
ciated with a risky project if the risk is borne by the public sec-
tor, as in that case the risk is divided among a large number of 
individuals, making individual risk assessment useless. Haveman argues 
that this is only a valid assumption if the number of inhabitants is 
extremely large (more than approx. 80 million) and if the effects of 
risks in the public sector are entirely independent from the private 
sector (which is an implausible assumption). 
The pooling argument takes for granted that - due to the wide varie-
ty of different public projects - risks borne by the government can 
essentially be better 'pooled' than in the private sector. This as-
sumption however is only valid if there is no correlation between the 
change in performance of the economy as a whole (measured in terms of 
GNP, e.g.) and the net benefits of the project concerned. 
Given the deficiencies of these two arguments, the author claims 
that a downward adjustment of the social rate of discount at the cost 
side of the project - at least in- case of high risks of public pro-
jects - is defendable. 
In this context however, Baumol (1968) has claimed that for society 
as a whole the pooling argument is still valid (both for private and 
public investments), provided the expected net benefits and risks of 
individual projects are taken into account in order to preclude an 
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inacceptable low level of anticipated performance of these projects. 
Therefore, in general, uncertainty and risk do not provide sufficiënt 
arguments for a discrepancy between the public and private social rate 
of discount. However, as it is coramon in the private sector to include 
a risk premium discount rate, there is a danger of an artificial - and 
hence inefficiënt - reallocation of investments towards the public 
sector. In such cases, a risk premium may also be included in the 
social rate of return. In general, there is no reason to assume a 
difference in risks between public and private projects. 
Next, Lind (1982) has argued - on the basis of a partial equilibrium 
approach - that it is neeessary to use a flexible social rate of 
discount for public projects which is dependent on the specific risks 
and the way of financing the projects concerned. He uses the concept 
of a social rate of time preference in the context of an optimal 
growth model for investments and related market portfolios. The pro-
ject-specifie, social rate of time preference equals in his specific 
approach to energy projects the profitability of assets with a risk 
factor comparable to that of energy projects. 
"On the basis of data on after-tax rates of return, we have taken 
4.6 percent to be the approximate risk-adjusted real rate of time 
preference that should apply to projects with the same risk as the 
market portfolio. Unless a strong argument can be made that the 
benefits and costs of a public investment or policy will not be 
highly correlated with the returns to the market portfolio, this 
should be the discount rate applied to the benefits and costs. On 
the basis of data on rates of return on Treasury bills, we assume 
1 percent is the real rate of time preference on safe investments 
and that 2 percent is the real rate of time preference associated 
with a long-term asset such as long-term government bonds, for 
which the primary risk is the level of interest rates. This last 
point is important considering energy policy and investments. If 
the pay-off to energy projects were uncorrelated with the return 
to the market portfolio, 2 percent would be the appropriate rate 
for discounting the net benefits of energy investments because 
such investments would be riskless except for the risk of interest 
rate changes."(p. 89) 
Related arguments can be found in Bailey and Jensen (1972) who also 
advocate an adjustment of discount rates for risks, on the basis of 
marginal capital costs (given the fact that the achievements of public 
investments follow - analogous to the private sector - a business 
cycle). 
Thus the conclusion is that a flexible social rate of discount may 
be justified on the basis of risks incurred in public investments, 
provided at least there is no official risk compensation in the pri-
vate sector and provided there is a link between the future variabili-
ty in the performance of the economy as a whole and that of the pro-
ject in particular. 
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4. The Financial Crowding-out Motive 
The way in which a public project is financed and the extent to 
which this has an irapact on the allocation of investment funds may 
provide another motive for advocating the possibility of a flexible 
discount rate. In particular, the crowding-out effect has to be men-
tioned in this context: if the social rate of discount is not running 
parallel to the market rate of discount, there is a danger that public 
projects are implemented that have a lower profitability than (non-
impleraented) projects in the private sector (see Bauraol, 1975, and 
Bradford, 1975). Such a misallocation of resources is detrimental to 
private capital formation or consumption. In order to restore the 
balance, it would be necessary to have precise insight into the finan-
cial sources of these public investments and into the degree to which 
private capital, consumption and idle balances are affected by crowd-
ing-out effects of a specific project. 
In this context, Lind (1982) has proposed to assess the shadow price 
of capital, through which costs and benefits of a public investment 
projects are transformed into private consumption equivalents. He 
States: 
"By using the concept of the shadow price of capital we can sepa-
rate the issues of social rate of time preference and the opportu-
nity cost of capital displacement for all public expenditure pro-
grams, not just public investraents. These costs are likely to be 
much less significant for public investraents that stimulate future 
private investment than for public consumption expenditures that 
displace private investment but do not stimulate any investment." 
(p. 55.) 
It has to be mentioned in this context that also the re-investment 
fraction of the net benefits of the project concerned are important 
for assessing the shadow price of capital: more re-investments would 
imply a higher shadow price of capital. This element is of course also 
relevant in the context of a multi-generational evaluation of public 
projects, as in this case it has to be judged whether current deci-
sions open more possibilities for re-investments by future genera-
tions. In the view of Lind the value of the abovementioned shadow 
price is determined by 4 factors: the social rate of time preference, 
the marginal profitability of investments in the private sector, the 
marginal savings rate, and the time horizon of the private investments 
affected by the crowding effects. 
In conclusion, the financial crowding-out effect provides a valid 
motive 'for a flexible social rate of discount. The 'shadow price' 
approach is in this context a plausible way of taking into considera-
tion the specific consequences of a certain public project. 
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5. The Externalities and Intangibles Motive 
In conventional cost-benefit analyses i t i s often usual to exclude 
social costs and benefits emanating frora ex te rna l i t i es or in tangibles . 
Especially the intangible effects which are not measurable in conven-
t ional economie terms have to be mentioned her e., pa r t i cu la r ly because 
they may have a s ignif icant influence on the future welfare position 
of society. In case of intangible social costs , i t i s often argued 
that a downward adjustment of the social ra te of discount i s necessary 
in order to impose a more s t r i c t f i l t e r i n g condition for- such public 
projects (cf. Haveman, 1977). However, in case of i r revers ib le effects 
i t i s according to Baumol (1968) preferable to use a se lect ive subsidy 
policy instead of a downward adjustment of the social ra te of d i s -
count. 
Fisher and Krut i l la (1975) argue that the environmental opportunity 
costs of a project , which involves the i r revers ib le conversion of 
(some part of) a unique natural environment (for example, a dam for 
hydroelectrie power or open-pit mining), should be calculated using a 
r a t e of discount lowered to re f l ec t a sh i f t in t a s tes over time in 
favour of the environment (induced by r i s ing income and education 
l eve l s ) . The benefits of the project on the other hand should be 
discounted with a r a t e that i s marked up so as to re f lec t the annual 
project - re la ted benef i ts ' depreciation. The l a t t e r i s caused by tech-
nological progress- which wil l expand capacity to produce ordinary 
goods and services (but not environments) and thus reduce the r e l a t i ve 
value of these goods and serv ices . 
I t should be noted that a l te rnat ive procedures have been proposed in 
the l i t e r a t u r e . For instance, Lind (1982) shows that i t i s possible to 
transform environmental effects - analogous to crowding-out effects -
by means of a shadow price for available income into consumption 
equivalents. Another poss ib i l i ty to take into account intangible 
effects has been proposed by Schulze et a l . (1981), who points out the 
analogy between the extra payments for dangerous work on the labour 
market and the necessary compensation for environmental r i sks in case 
of public investment projects (see also Thaler and Rosen, 1976). The 
authors make a clear d is t inc t ion between voluntary and compensated 
r i sks on the one hand and involuntary and uncompensated r i sks on the 
other hand. However, i t i s worth mentioning that these authors pay 
l i t t l e a t tent ion to the uncertainty regarding the f inancial evaluation 
of social costs (and benefits) for future generations. 
In th i s context, the option value theory may be important, as then 
i t may be possible to assess the monetary value of the aggregate 
consumer surplus, which i s attached by future generations to th i s 
value (see Haveman, 1977, and Nash, 1973). Especially in case of 
i r revers ib le effects th i s may be a relevant approach. This may u l t i -
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mately also lead to a change in the social rate of discount, as this 
is closely related to risk-avert behaviour (see also section 3). It is 
worthwhile to quote Haveman (1977) here: 
"All of these adjustments can be translated into a reduction (or 
increase) in the discount rate used to estimate the present values 
of future damages (benefits) and, hence, an increase (decrease) in 
the social evaluation of these effects from the ones indicated by 
their expected value... Many of the major technological develop-
ments - for example, nuclear power - appear to carry with them ir-
reversible negative effects, often having the character of a pub-
lic good. Assuming that individuals are risk-averse... The cumula-
tive adjustment for uncertainty in these cases implies a need for 
substantial caution in appraising requests for the commitment of 
additional social resources to these activities." (pp. 372-373) 
Similar arguments can be found in Pearce (1977, 1983). 
In case of exhaustible resources, it has been argued (see Dasgupta 
and Heal, 1974) that it is important to include also a probability 
factor for finding suitable substitutes for the resource concerned; 
this factor is of course determined by technological progress. Fur-
thermore, Myers (1977) has argued that in case of exhaustible living 
resources a very low social rate of discount (e.g., 1 percent) may be 
desirable in order to prevent an extinction of certain species. 
In conclusion, the externalities and intangibles motive may lead to 
a valid argument for adjusting the social rate of discount for public 
investments, either via shadow prices or via option values. Irreversi-
bility and replenishability appear to be of decisive relevance in this 
respect. Clearly, it has to be admitted that also a direct adjustment 
of costs and benefits for such intangibles (instead of an indirect 
adjustment via the discount rate) may still be a useful option. 
6* A Systematic Review of Arguments in Favour of a Flexible Social 
Rate of Discount 
Having discussed now in sections 2-5 four major motives for using a 
flexible discount rate, we will in the present section provide a 
representative overview of authors who have discussed in the past the 
various arguments pro and contra a flexible social rate of discount 
for public investment planning. For the ease of presentation we will 
use a systematic survey table, which gives a listing of the abovemen-
tioned four motives, as well as a listing of successive authors. It 
has to be added that this table is mainly indicative: absolute judge-
ments or statements are hard to draw from the wide variety of contri-
butions in the literature. But an attempt has been made to present 
each author's position more precisely by making a distinction between 
the following aspects of an affirmative argument supporting the use of 
a flexible social rate of discount: 
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(i) the judgement of public projeets should explicitly take into ac-
count the effects associated with (at least one of) the four 
abovementioned motives for using a flexible discount rate. 
(ii) the judgement of a public project may be based explicitly on a 
social rate of discount that may vary among different projeets. 
(iii) the use of a flexible social rate of discount for judging a 
public project as a whole may implicitly be defended in the 
light of the intention or way of reasoning of the author con-
cerned. 
(iv) the judgement of a public project may explicitly be based on a 
social rate of discount that varies among the components or as-
pects of a particular project. 
(v) the use of a flexible social rate of discount which varies among 
the components or aspects of a project may implicitly be de-
fended in the light of the arguments used by the author con-
cerned. 
Table 1 gives a comprehensive overview of our literature search, based 
on 24 authors. 
It is interesting to observe that problems of intergenerational 
equity receive much attention in the literature. The remaining motives 
receive less attention, although the frequency of occurrence of these 
motives is more or less equal. The final conclusion from our previous 
analysis is rather straightforward. Economists have provided a wealth 
of arguments that justify the use of a flexible social rate of dis-
count, based on four classes of motives. Our typological approach does 
not lead to the normative conclusion that flexible social rates of 
discount are by definition necessary, but to the more modest conclu-
sion that - in a particular context with a particular project and 
particular impacts - the use of a flexible social rate of discount is 
plausible, as it may be defended on economie grounds. 
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author 
brief 
char act er i zat i on 
motive 
intergen- r isk and f inancial ex te rna l i -
erat ional uncer- crowding- t i e s and 
equity ta in ty out intangibles 
Baumol r isk mark-up i s 
(1968) needed in private 
and public sector , 
i f no r i sk subsidy 
does exist in order 
to prevent crowding-
out. 
(i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
(i) (i) 
Bradford social rate of dis-
(1975) count should be 
based on social 
rate of time prefer-
ence and use a shad-
ow price for capital 
equal to 1 
Dasgupta for exhaustible and ( i ) 
and Heal non-replenishable 
(1974) resources a variable 
term has to be in-
cluded in the social 
rate of discount 
that reflects the 
probability of find-
ing a substitute 
Fisher mark-up for techno- (i) 
and logical progress (ii) 
Krutilla when discounting the (v) 
(1975) benefits of project-
related services; 
lower the rate of 
discount to account 
for a shift in tastes 
in favour of the en-
vironment when dis-
counting the environ-
mental opportunity 
costs of a project 
Fisher create option value (i) 
(1981) if new information is (ii) 
forthcoming on the (v) 
benefits of a project, 
which involves the 
irreversible convér-
sion óf a unique na-
tural environment, and 
on those of the pre-
servation alternative 
(i) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
( i ) ( i ) 
( i i ) ( i i ) 
(v) (v) 
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author 
brief 
characterization 
motive 
intergen- risk and financial externali-
erational uncer- crowding- ties and 
equity tainty out intangibles 
Freeman intergenerational 
(1977) distribution pro-
blems have to be 
separated from the 
social rate of dis-
count problem 
Haveman it is necessary to 
(1977) create option values 
in case of irrevers-
ibilities; the so-
cial rate of dis-
count has to be ad-
justed if the risk 
of a public project 
rests with the pri-
vate sector, or if 
there is a relation-
snip between the 
variability of the 
performance of the 
project concerned 
and that of the 
whole economy 
(i) 
(i) (i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
(i) (i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
Kirsch no emphasis has to (i) 
(1984) be placed on the 
intragenerational 
conflict on the 
i nt er gen er at i onal 
distribution and the 
related assurance 
problems 
Klaassen the level of genera- (i) 
and Iwema tional preference (ii) 
(1981) rate depends on in- (v) 
tangible elements 
in the project 
(i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
Lind the social rate of 
(1982) discount may be ad-
justed for risk, the 
financing aspects, 
and intangibles 
(i) (i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
(i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
(i) 
Marglin the reinvestment frac- (i) 
(1963) tion, the private op-
portunity costs and the 
social rate of time 
preference are of de-
cisive importance 
(i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
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author 
brief 
characterization 
motive 
intergen- risk and financial externali-
erational uncer- crowding- ties and 
equity tainty out intangibles 
Mendel- the reinvestment 
sohn fraction, the pri-
(1981) vate opportunity 
costs and the social 
rate of time prefer-
ence are of decisive 
importance 
Mishan intergenerational (i) 
(1977) distribution pro-
blems are essential-
ly socio-ethical 
problems 
Mueller the social rate of (i) 
(1974) discount may be based 
on a Harsanyi inter-
generational equity 
viewpoint 
Myers there are two social (i) 
(1977) rates of discount, .(iii) 
i.e. a low one in (v) 
case of exhaustible 
living resources and 
a higher one (based 
on the social oppor-
tunity cost rate) in 
other cases 
(i) 
(ii) 
Cv) 
(i) 
(i) 
(iii) 
(v) 
(i) 
(iii) 
(v) 
Nash opportunity costs (i) 
(1973) arguments provide a (ii) 
robustness motive in (v) 
case of long-term or 
irreversible effects 
for future genera-
tions 
(i) (i) 
(ii) 
(v) 
(i) 
Page discount rate serves (i) 
(1977) as intergenerational 
efficiency criterion; 
intergenerational 
equity may be based on 
simple rules of thumb 
Pearce long-term detriment- (i) 
(1983) al effects require 
essentially ethical 
criteria outside the 
realm of economics 
(i) 
(i) (i) 
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author 
brief 
char act er i zat i on 
motive 
intergen- risk and financial externali-
erational uncer- crowding- ties and 
equity tainty out intangibles 
Pigou the government is 
(1924) better informed than 
individuals and is 
able to take care of 
future interests 
(i) 
Schulze in case of long-term 
et al. or irreversible ef-
(1981) fects ethical crite-
ria become of para-
mount importance 
(i) (i) (i) 
Sen the isolation para-
(1967) dox is practically 
closely associated 
with the multigener-
ational problem 
(i) 
Sen beside a utilitarian 
(1982) and a Rawlsian ap-
proach one may adopt 
a socalled freedom 
approach 
(i) 
Sol ow the social rate of (i) 
(1974) discount can be ad-
justed for a Rawls-
ian intergeneration-
al allocation ap-
proach 
Zimmer- the deficiency of (i) (i) (i) (i) 
mann the market rate of (ii) (ii) (ii) (ii) 
(1983) interest leads to (v) (v) (v) (v) 
the necessity to use 
alternative values 
for the social rate 
of discount 
Table 1. A Review of Arguments in Favour of a Flexible Social Rate of 
Discount 
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